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ABSTRACT
Personal and contextual information are increasingly shared
via mobile social networks. Users’ locations, activities and
their co-presence can be shared easily with online “friends”,
as their smartphones already access such information from
embedded sensors and storage. Yet, people usually exhibit
selective sharing behavior depending on contextual attributes,
thus showing that privacy, utility, and usability are paramount
to the success of such online services. In this paper, we
present SPISM, a novel information-sharing system that de-
cides (semi-)automatically whether to share information with
others, whenever they request it, and at what granularity.
Based on active machine learning and context, SPISM adapts
to each user’s behavior and it predicts the level of detail for
each sharing decision, without revealing any personal infor-
mation to a third-party. Based on a personalized survey about
information sharing involving 70 participants, our results pro-
vide insight into the most inﬂuential features behind a sharing
decision. Moreover, we investigate the reasons for the users’
decisions and their conﬁdence in them. We show that SPISM
outperforms other kinds of global and individual policies, by
achieving up to 90% of correct decisions.
Author Keywords
Information-sharing; Decision-making; Machine Learning;
User study; Privacy.
ACM Classiﬁcation Keywords
H.5.2 Information interfaces and presentation (e.g., HCI):
Miscellaneous.
INTRODUCTION
Mobile social networks are becoming extremely popular. As
for 2013, more than 250 million people use their smartphones
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in order to get the latest updates from their favorite social net-
works1. Having access to users’ personal data and physical
context (through an increasing number of embedded sensors),
mobile devices represent a simple means to quickly share in-
formation with others; location and photos are just two exam-
ples of data that can be easily shared. In addition to the user-
triggered sharing decisions, applications such as FourSquare
and the now-closed Gowalla enable users to conﬁgure their
smartphones to share their location and co-presence automat-
ically. With a small set of default information-sharing poli-
cies, users have the possibility to adjust the settings in order
to match their sharing behaviors with their privacy concerns.
Prior studies on sharing behavior in mobile social networks
have investigated the issues related to contextual information-
sharing [4, 18, 19, 23]. By analyzing people’s sharing behav-
iors in different contexts, they show that it is possible to de-
termine the features that most inﬂuence users’ sharing deci-
sions, such as the identity of the person that is requesting the
information and the current location [23]. For instance, tools
such as the location-sharing systems Locaccino [24] and Peo-
pleFinder [18] have been used to gain signiﬁcant insight into
the beneﬁts of providing users with the ability to set personnal
sharing policies. Two recurrent ﬁndings in UbiComp studies
are that (i) users are not particularly good at effectively artic-
ulating their information-sharing policies (compared to their
actual behavior) [18] and (ii) that sharing policies evolve over
time [18, 24].
In order to overcome these two issues, machine learning
techniques have been applied to improve to some extent the
decision-making process [8, 9, 18]. The advantage of such
systems is that they can decide in a (semi-)automatic fashion
whether or not to share information. Most existing schemes,
however, enable users to share only a speciﬁc kind of infor-
mation (e.g., location). Moreover, they only make binary de-
cisions on whether to share the requested information. In par-
ticular, this last issue is often mentioned as a crucial catalyst
for overcoming concerns related to privacy [21] and to a more
open, sharing behavior.
In our work, we perform a comprehensive study of
1Social networking statistics, http://www.statisticbrain.com/
social-networking-statistics/
information-sharing in mobile social networks, by tackling,
all at once, the issues related to context, user-burden trade-
offs and privacy. We introduce SPISM, a novel information-
sharing system (implemented on Android) that decides, in a
(semi-)automatic fashion, whether or not to share information
(and the level of detail of the information to be shared) with
other users or services, based on contextual features and past
behavior. The decision-making core is supported by an active
learning method that enables SPISM to either decide auto-
matically – whenever the conﬁdence in the decision is high
enough – or to rely on the user’s input otherwise. SPISM
works with any existing (mobile) social network and can be
used transparently by users, as it can operate at the operating
system level, ﬁltering all requests for personal information
and replying according to the user’s behavior.
The contribution of this work is three-fold. First, we de-
velop a novel information-sharing system (SPISM) for (semi-
)automatic decision-making in mobile social networks: It en-
ables users to share different types of information (location,
activity and co-presence of other people) with other users
or services in a privacy-aware fashion. Second, we con-
duct a personalized online study involving 70 participants
where, in addition to collecting data about their sharing be-
haviors, we provide insight into two other crucial factors in
UbiComp studies [3]: The reason behind a decision to share
and the conﬁdence that the user has in her decision. Third,
we evaluate SPISM with respect to the amount of training
data (provided by the user) and its performance, and com-
pare it against two policy-based mechanisms. Our results
show that SPISM signiﬁcantly outperforms both the individ-
ual user-privacy policies and several consolidated ones that
are based on statistical analysis [2, 23], and it achieves up to
90% of correct sharing decisions. We also demonstrate the
advantages of active learning techniques in our setting.
RELATED WORK
A substantial research effort has been made on the topic of
privacy and information sharing in mobile social networks,
notably with respect to the attitudes of people when sharing
static and contextual data with other peers. The studies that
are most related to our work can be grouped, from a high-
level perspective, into two categories: (i) contextual informa-
tion sharing and privacy [4, 19, 23] and (ii) machine learning
for information sharing [1, 8, 9, 13, 17, 18].
Contextual Information Sharing and Privacy
Smith et al. [19] provide an early investigation on technolo-
gies that allow people to share their contextual information,
such as location, in mobile social networks. In addition to al-
lowing users to manually decide when to share their location
with others, the authors implemented a system called Reno
that can automate the process based on a set of pre-deﬁned re-
gions. By allowing Reno to automatically send notiﬁcations
whenever the user entered or exited such regions, the authors
show that there is both a value and a cost associated with au-
tomatic information disclosure. In particular, they show that
static rules for location sharing in pre-deﬁned regions are in-
effective in accurately expressing the users’ actual behavior
when other contextual elements change, such as the time of
the day or the day of the week. By taking into account such
limitations in our work, we consider a wide set of contex-
tual features (discussed in the “SPISM Information-Sharing
Platform” section) in order to increase the ﬂexibility of the
decision-making process.
More recently, Toch et al. [23] study the effect of the type
of locations visited by the users on their willingness to share
them with others. By considering simple statistical models
that take into account factors other than the geographic lo-
cation, the authors showed that the semantic category of the
location being shared (such as a shopping center or a hospital)
and the social group of the person asking for the location are
signiﬁcant factors in deciding whether to share the location.
These results support earlier efforts [2, 11, 18] in providing
a set of contextual features that have a statistically signiﬁ-
cant impact on the location-sharing behavior of mobile users.
We use these results for our application when deﬁning ini-
tial universal sharing policies, and will describe them in the
“Evaluation” section.
In an attempt to capture the cost of mistakenly revealing a
location due to ineffective sharing policies, in addition to
sharing preferences, Benisch et al. [4] compare simple ac-
cess control policies (white lists) to more sophistacated ones
(based on time, day and location). They found out that (i)
the accuracy of the sharing policies increases with their com-
plexity (or ﬂexibility), and that (ii) the accuracy beneﬁts are
the greatest for the highly sensitive information. This sug-
gests that the notion of the cost of mistakenly revealing in-
formation to unauthorized parties (in particular contexts) is
an important factor in designing and optimizing automated
information-sharing mechanisms.
Wiese et al. [25] investigate the effect of physical and per-
ceived social closeness on people’s willingness to share in-
formation with others. Among the main results of the study,
the authors show that social closeness and the frequency of
communication are better predictors of sharing than physi-
cal proximity. Moreover, these two factors were also shown
to have a capacity to predict sharing better than the social
groups of the people asking for the information. Thus, the
authors suggest that automatic methods for inferring social
closeness could be suited for accurate information-sharing
decisions more than physical co-location, in the case auto-
mated mechanisms (such as in [10,14,20,22]) are envisaged.
Machine Learning and Information Sharing
Whereas studies on information-sharing attitudes and privacy
shed light on the behavior of people and the factors that inﬂu-
ence their decisions, they are mostly concerned about under-
standing the causes and effects of such behavior. Meanwhile,
there has been a substantial effort in devising methods that
help and nudge the users to make information-sharing deci-
sions, or even make decisions on their behalf. We present
some of these methods, including both supervised and unsu-
pervised approaches for decision-making.
In [18], Sadeh et al. compare the accuracy of user-deﬁned
sharing policies with an automated mechanism (case-based
reasoner) and a machine learning approach (random forests),
showing that these approaches have an accuracy better than
the user-deﬁned policies. Owing in part to the greater ﬂex-
ibility of the supervised machine-learning approaches com-
pared to the more coarse-grained user-deﬁned policies, the
automated methods also beneﬁted from the fact that users ap-
peared to not be able to create sharing rules consistent with
their own choices. On the contrary, the feedback provided by
the users to the machine-learning methods did however ap-
pear to be consistent with their actual sharing behavior, which
helped the automated methods to achieve better accuracy re-
sults. We include the user feedback in our learning mecha-
nism and use it to adapt the automated decisions to the user
behavior that can change over time.
Unsupervised or semi-supervised methods, which reduce the
initial setup burden of the default sharing policies for each
user, are investigated in [8, 9]. For instance, Danezis [8] pro-
poses a method for automatically extracting privacy settings
for online social networks; the method is based on the notion
of a limited proliferation of information outside of a given
social context. The proposed method, which determines co-
hesive groups of users where users belonging to a group have
stronger ties to the users outside of the group, shows promis-
ing results on a limited set of evaluation samples. This study
also shows that the social groups, and especially methods for
their automated extraction, are a key factor to sharing private
information in social networks. Our work uses both the Face-
book social graph and our system’s contacts list to automati-
cally extract social groups or communities and uses them to
relieve the user from the burden of manually assigning people
to different social groups.
Fang and LeFevre [9] propose a novel approach to the in-
ference and deﬁnition of access control policies for personal
information on online social networks. They enable the su-
pervised learning mechanism to learn the sharing preferences
of a user by asking her a limited number of questions about
her sharing behavior with some of her friends; these speciﬁc
friends are the most “informative”, i.e., those for which the
classiﬁer is most uncertain about. The authors show that their
approach of iteratively asking questions about the most uncer-
tain case (active learning with uncertainty sampling) reduces
the effort required by the users and maintains a high accuracy
compared to the ground truth (based on a 45-user study on
Facebook). Active learning is a feature that we exploit in our
application as well. Moreover, we allow users to update their
sharing decision a posteriori, meaning that users are able to
change their decision after it has been made; the application
then learns from this new decision and takes it into account
the next time the same context appears again.
Bigwood et al. [5] evaluate different machine learning algo-
rithms for information sharing in terms of information over-
exposure and correct decisions. Although their work is fo-
cused exclusively on binary (yes/no) location-sharing, the
authors provide a machine-learning-based determination of
the most inﬂuential features for the sharing decisions; more-
over, they take into account cost-sensitive classiﬁers to reduce
over-exposure. We believe this to be a promising direction to
explore, and we will evaluate the effects of cost-sensitivity
and granularity on the performance of our decision-making
framework in the follow-up of this work.
THE SPISM INFORMATION-SHARING PLATFORM
In this section, we describe the functionality, the operat-
ing principle, the architecture and the design of the SPISM
information-sharing platform.
In order to better understand the following, we need to distin-
guish between two different kinds of subscribers to SPISM:
(i) the requester, who wants to know something about other
subscribers by sending information requests, and (ii) the tar-
get, who receives requests for information.
The SPISM platform is composed of the SPISM application,
that runs on mobile devices (as for now it is implemented
only for the Android platform), and the SPISM Information
Sharing Directory (ISD), that runs on a dedicated server.
Overview
The SPISM application enables subscribers, who can be
users, third-party online services or mobile apps, to request
information about other subscribers. The information that
can be requested includes contextual data (the geographic lo-
cation and the wireless identiﬁers of physically co-located
devices) and the time-schedule availability. The geographic
location is determined by processing data obtained from the
embedded GPS sensor (if available) or by WiFi tri-lateration
(which relies on the Google localization service). The list
of devices that are physically co-located with the target sub-
scriber is obtained through periodic scans of the Bluetooth
and WiFi interfaces. If a MAC address in the vicinity of the
target is a known MAC address (there exist an entry associ-
ated with a subscriber in the contact list of the target), the
name of the contact is displayed. Finally, the schedule avail-
ability is obtained from the subscriber’s calendar (accessed
through the on-device calendar application). Subscribers can
specify a level of detail for the requested information: low,
medium or high. The information sent by the target sub-
scriber is provided with a level of detail lower or equal to
the requested level. For the location, the coordinates are trun-
cated; for the neighboring devices, the presence (i.e., some
devices/no devices), the number, or the identiﬁers of the de-
vices are provided; for the schedule availability, the availabil-
ity (i.e., busy/available), the title or the detailed record of the
calendar activity is provided. Figure 1 shows the main ap-
plication windows, where subscribers can log in and register,
request the location, the co-located devices and the availabil-
ity of their contact, as well as enjoy additional features such
as visualizing the past activity and their contacts’ list.
System Model
The SPISM platform is composed of the ISD and the sub-
scribers of the service, who can be either users or third-party
online services. The roles of the ISD and of the subscribers
are as follows:
• ISD: Its main purpose is to allow users to discover the cur-
rent IP addresses of their contacts when they want to send
them information requests. The ISD stores the list of reg-
istered SPISM subscribers, their credentials, their contact
Figure 1. SPISM mobile application interfaces. From left to right, the
different windows allow users to register and log in, check other sub-
scribers’ current location, the other devices around them, their avail-
ability. The subscribers can access other features such as the record of
past activity and their contacts’ lists.
lists and the MAC addresses of the Bluetooth interfaces of
each user’s mobile devices. The subscribers interact with
the ISD in the registration phase (once per user), during the
log-in phase (once per application start), when download-
ing the contacts lists, when periodically reporting their IP
and updating their online status, and when sending infor-
mation requests to one of their contacts.
• Subscribers: A subscriber, either an online service or a
mobile user, can be a requester (when she sends queries to
another subscriber) or a target (when she receives queries
from other subscribers). In order to inform the ISD of her
online status, each subscriber connected to the ISD sends
periodic keep-alive messages. Requesters can see, at any
time, the list of online and ofﬂine contacts, and they can
choose to send queries to the online subscribers in their
contacts list, in order to know their location, the devices
around them and their availability. The requests that tar-
get subscribers receive and process are based on several
features of their current physical and social contexts, in-
cluding their current location, the time of the day and the
people that are currently close by.
To enhance the security of the communications, all messages
exchanged between the subscribers and the ISD are encrypted
with a public-key certiﬁcate obtained from a trusted Certi-
ﬁcation Authority (CA). In order to protect users’ privacy
with respect to the ISD, no information requests or replies
are tunneled through the ISD. This is a crucial aspect of
our platform, as it prevents the service provider from learn-
ing the information sent by a subscriber about her location,
physical context and availability. A shortcoming of this ap-
proach is that the requester knows the IP address of the target,
and therefore she may be able to infer the target’s coarse-
grained location (based on IP-geolocation) and to infer the
co-location of multiple targets if they share the same public
IP (when connected to an access point using Network Ad-
dress Translation for example). Conversely, the target may
know the IP address of the requester. Note however, that a
user can conceal her IP address by making use of proxies or
anonymous networks such as Tor.2
Operating Principle
SPISM works as follows. A user ﬁrst logs in to the ISD with
her username and password. She can subsequently report her
online status and obtain the online status (and IP addresses)
of her contacts from the ISD. In a typical scenario, the user
requests some information from one of her (connected) con-
tacts. To do so, the user ﬁrst chooses the type of information
she wants to request, by selecting the corresponding icon in
the main window (See Figure 1), and then she selects the tar-
get subscriber from the list of her connected contacts. Finally,
the user speciﬁes the level of detail for the requested informa-
tion and the request is prepared and sent directly to the target
subscriber’s device. If the reply is received within a ﬁxed
amount of time (typically a few seconds) it is automatically
showed to the user, together with the requested information
if shared by the targeted requester (See Figure 1); otherwise,
the user is redirected to the main window and she will be no-
tiﬁed when the reply is received. At the targeted subscriber’s
device, the request is processed automatically when it is re-
ceived: (1) The requested information is stored and (2) the
information linked to the request (i.e., the time, the type of in-
formation requested and the requester) is combined with var-
ious contextual features (periodically collected in the back-
ground by SPISM from the various data sources and sensors
available on the device) and fed to the information-sharing
framework that we describe in detail in the next section. If
SPISM can make the decision with enough conﬁdence, based
on the target subscriber’s past decisions, the request is pro-
cessed automatically. Otherwise, the target subscriber is no-
tiﬁed and asked to decide; Her decision is then stored (note
that the target subscriber can postpone her decision). Once a
decision is made, it is sent back to the requester together with
the requested information if the decision is positive. Before
being sent, the requested information is processed to match
the level of detail speciﬁed by the decision. All the sent and
received requests are stored and can be accessed by the user
by selecting the corresponding icon in the main window. In
particular, the user can audit automatic decisions and correct
those she disagrees with (to avoid similar errors in the fu-
ture).
Decision Making
The SPISM information-sharing decision-making core pro-
cesses each incoming information request. In order to make
the decision, several contextual features are taken into ac-
count by the target device. Features such as the identity
of and the social ties with the requester, the current loca-
tion and the activity of the target, the people around the tar-
get and the time of the day were extensively studied in the
past; several independent pieces of work show (with statis-
tical signiﬁcance) that they are strongly correlated with the
information-sharing behavior of mobile users [2, 6, 7, 19, 23].
With these ﬁndings, we incorporated 18 such features in the
SPISM decision-making core; the list of all the features we
included is shown in Table 1. Due to the different natures of
2https://www.torproject.org/
Feature Type Feature Type
Person
Familiarity Float 
When?
Time Int. 
Social tie Cat. Weekday Cat. 
User ID Cat. Daytime Cat.
Service Servicecategory 
Cat. Activity Cat. 
What? Request type Cat. With  
whom? 
Neighbors Int. 
Details Float Neighbors 
Type Cat.
Location 
Latitude Float 
Longitude Float 
Last
interact. 
Time last 
request
Float 
Semantic 
location 
Cat. Details last 
request
Float 
Table 1. Features used by the SPISM machine learning framework to
decide whether or not to share information and with what accuracy.
the features, some of them are deﬁned as categorical (they are
in a ﬁnite and pre-deﬁned set of values, such as the social ties
with the requester) or numerical (ﬂoating or integer values for
the time and location coordinates).
Some of these 18 features can be extracted from the request
itself or the target mobile device, such as the time, the cur-
rent schedule availability or the requester ID, whereas other
features require more information, e.g., the social ties with
the requester and the semantics of the current location of the
target subscriber. To obtain such information, SPISM takes
advantage of the existing social networks, such as Facebook,
and other data available on the phone (e.g., call logs). In addi-
tion, other third-party services (such as Google Maps, Open-
StreetMap and the Android application store, i.e., Google
Play) are used to obtain more information about the location
and type of application (in the case where the requester is a
mobile application). In some cases, the extraction of the fea-
tures requires access to the sensors embedded on the device;
GPS and Bluetooth scans usually require a non-negligible
amount of time and resources [16], and a per-request ac-
cess to such sensors can drain the battery. For this reason,
some time- or energy-consuming features (such as the GPS
coordinates and Bluetooth MAC addresses of the nearby de-
vices) are obtained periodically and cached, so that they can
be polled by the device at any time instant without incurring
resource-consuming operations. Note that the location, the
list of nearby devices and the schedule availability are all used
to make the decision and to be shared.
After all 18 features have been extracted from the request and
determined from the context, they are aggregated into a fea-
ture vector and fed to a classiﬁer. The output space of the
classiﬁer comprises four different classes that encode whether
the information is shared and, if yes, the corresponding level
of detail, speciﬁcally “No”, “Yes (low)”, Yes (“medium”) and
“Yes (high)”. SPISM makes use of a Logistic classiﬁer im-
plemented in the WEKA3 Android library.
STUDY AND DATA COLLECTION
In order to better understand how users share information and
to evaluate the efﬁcacy of the SPISM framework with respect
to sharing decisions, we ran a user study in early 2013. The
3http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
study consists of an online survey that puts the participants
in realistic, personalized and contextual UbiComp sharing
scenarios where they are asked to answer a set of questions
regarding their willingness to share private information, the
conﬁdence in and reason for their decisions.
Participants and Remuneration
We recruited people directly from four large university cam-
puses (in the US, Canada and Europe), and indirectly via the
Amazon Mechanical Turk platform (MTurk)4. The latter al-
lowed us to draw participants from a pool of non-student pop-
ulation, in order to limit the bias towards academic and stu-
dent behaviors. To advertise our study, we used dedicated
mailing-lists and we ran a media campaign through Face-
book, LinkedIn, Google+ and ofﬁcial university websites, co-
ordinated by our academic media ofﬁce. We screened partic-
ipants according to the following prerequisites: (i) aged be-
tween 18 and 80 years, (ii) with an active Facebook account
with at least 50 friends and (iii) uses a smartphone. Such
criteria were selected so as to sample people that are active
in social networks and are aware of the information-sharing
possibilities linked to the use of smartphones. Furthermore,
we screened the MTurk workers who could access our survey
based on their past Human Intelligence Task (HIT) approval
rate (>95%) and the number of past approved HITs (>100).
This was only a preliminary step for preventing non-serious
and inexperienced MTurk workers from accessing our survey.
The survey requires access to private information of the par-
ticipants (such as names of their friends on Facebook5) and it
demands a signiﬁcant amount of time (40 - 60 minutes). To
provide incentives for the completion of the survey, we imple-
mented two separate reward schemes: (i) the chance for one
participant to win an Apple iPad and (ii) a ﬁxed amount of
money (US$4.5/HIT [12]). The ﬁrst option was proposed to
the participants recruited at the universities and through the
academic media, whereas the second option was offered to
the workers of the Amazon Mechanical Turk. We chose not
to offer the second option to the academic participants due to
our experience gained from previous on-campus studies: It
appeared that the motivation for ﬁnancial rewards was lower
than for the possibility of winning a popular gadget.
Online Survey
We structured our survey in ﬁve parts: With a total of 94 ques-
tions, the ﬁrst 19 are ﬁxed (the same for each participant)
and the last 75 are personalized (based on each participant’s
Facebook friends). In the very ﬁrst part, the participants were
required to log in to their Facebook account and grant our
application access to their friend list.
4https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome
5Before beginning the survey, the participants are informed that they
would need to reveal the names of their Facebook friends for the
purpose of this study. They approve a data retention and processing
agreement, informing them that all data collected in our study is used
solely for the purpose of our academic research project, and that
we will not disclose or use it in any other way than what explicitly
mentioned. Once the survey is completed, the name of the Facebook
friends are replaced with anonymous identiﬁers.
In the ﬁrst 15 questions, the participants were asked about
their demographics, technology usage and privacy attitudes,
in particular with respect to online social networks.
In the next question (16), the participants were asked to as-
sign some of their friends to social groups, and we presented
them with ﬁve distinct categories (based on [25]): (1) school
colleagues, (2) friends, (3) family members, (4) work col-
leagues and (5) acquaintances. Each participant could assign
one Facebook contact to at most one category. It is possible,
however, that one such contact is a member of several cate-
gories (a school colleague that she works with currently). In
this case, the participants were instructed to assign the con-
tact to the most appropriate category.
In questions 17 through 19, the participants were asked to
enter a set of information-sharing rules in free-text. The shar-
ing rules are entered as a set of logical expressions that are
based on the following features: (1) the participant’s current
location, (2) people nearby, (3) social group of the requester,
(4) time of the day and (5) weekday/weekend. They can put
conditions on these features (such as =, <,>, =,∈ or cate-
gorical values). For example, a location-sharing rule could be
deﬁned as:
“I am at a friend’s place AND with acquaintance
AND the requester is a work colleague: do not share”
In the last 75 questions, the participants were presented with
sharing scenarios and they were asked to decide whether they
want to share the speciﬁc information in the given context,
their conﬁdence in the decision and the level of detail. A
typical scenario is “Would you share your location with John
on Saturday at 11:PM, assuming you are at an event with
work colleagues?” (where the requester name is chosen from
the participant’s Facebook friends and the other features are
chosen at random).
Depending on their answers (“Yes”, “No” and “Uncertain”)
to the questions in this part, participants were presented with
sub-questions. More speciﬁcally, “Yes” and “No” answers
were followed by a set of additional questions asking the par-
ticipants about the conﬁdence in their decisions (i.e., “not
so conﬁdent”, “conﬁdent”, “very conﬁdent”) and the features
that inﬂuenced the most their decision (i.e., “requester”, “day
of the week”, “time”, “location” or “neighboring people”).
For “Yes” answers, the participants were also asked about the
level of detail of the shared information (“low”, “medium”
or “high”). Similarly, “Uncertain” answers were followed by
sub-questions regarding the reasons for being uncertain, such
as a conﬂict between some features (in this case, the partic-
ipant can specify the features that motivates her the most to
share and to not share, and then specify in free text the reason
they conﬂict) or simply a lack of information (in this case the
participant can specify which information would have helped
her reach a decision).
In order to detect sloppy answers (e.g., random answers or
bots), we included a number of “dummy” questions that re-
quire human understanding to be correctly answered [12,15].
These are questions such as simple computations (e.g., “3 +
4”) or general-knowledge questions (e.g., “How many days
are there in one week?”). Based on the answers to these
questions and on the survey timing data (explained below),
we ruled out dishonest participants from the dataset.
General Statistics and Validation
A total of 194 participants took part in our survey. 78 (40%)
of them did not complete it, leaving 116 (60%) complete
questionnaires. Out of these, 56 (48%) came from the uni-
versity advertisement campaign (UNI) and 60 (52%) were re-
cruited via MTurk. The average age of all the respondents
is 27y±7 (Mturk avg. 31y±6, UNI avg. 25y±6), and 74%
of them are male. 42% of all participants are students, 25%
work in the IT industry and 8% in the education sector. It took
44±15 minutes on average to complete the survey (MTurk
avg. 42 minutes, UNI avg. 47 minutes). We observed a sharp
contrast, with respect to privacy concerns, between the two
groups of participants: Most MTurk participants were not,
or slightly, concerned about their privacy whereas most UNI
participants were concerned about it.
Based on internal survey tests and detailed timing statistics,
only the questionnaires that meet the following four valida-
tion criteria were retained.
• All answers to the dummy questions are correct;
• At least one different Facebook friend is assigned to each
of the 5 social groups;
• The survey completion time is greater than 30 minutes.
• At least three of the following four timing conditions are
met6: (1) Facebook friends assignment to groups time >5
minutes, (2) location sharing scenarios time >4 minutes,
(3) activity sharing scenarios time >4 minutes, (4) nearby
people sharing scenarios time >4 minutes.
All participants correctly answered the dummy questions.
Based on timings, 46 (40%) of them were ruled out and 70
(60%) were kept for the analysis (33 MTurk and 37 UNI).
The demographics remained mostly unaltered.
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
In this section, we present three sets of results. First, using
descriptive statistics of the survey questionnaire, we discuss
the effect on the sharing decisions of different contextual fea-
tures, of the requester, of the information type, and the main
reasons behind the decisions. Second, we compare the per-
formance of the SPISM automated decision-making process
against that of the users’ own policies and an established de-
fault policy. Third, we discuss the effects of the increase of
user-involvement on the performance of SPISM, by using ac-
tive learning with different conﬁdence thresholds.
Survey Statistics
Based on the survey data, we computed the proportion of
“Yes/No/Uncertain” decisions for the different values of each
contextual feature we considered, such as the participant’s
current location, the social group of the requester, the time
6These timing conditions were determined based on the observed
timing distributions among all participants and on sample executions
performed by test users.
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Figure 2. Histograms of the information-sharing decisions by (a) information type, (b) social group of the requester and (c) the time of the day.
of day, day of week, and the type of information requested.
We found that the two that have the largest effect on the de-
cision are the social group of the requester and the type of
information that is being requested.
Regarding the type of information being asked, Figure 2a
shows that users disclose their location in 64% of the cases
(the sum of the “yes (low)”, “yes (medium)” and “yes (high)”
bars, aggregated over the 70 participants and for all the 25
location-sharing questions – out of the 75 questions – that is
a total of 1,750 answers), and only 8% of the time at a coarse
granularity (“Yes (low)”). The information about activity and
people nearby is disclosed 50% of the time. People tend to
be slightly more willing to share their location than to share
other information7: Location, contrary to the activity and the
co-presence of other people, is widely shared information in
most mobile social networks. In addition, this was conﬁrmed
by self-reported privacy concerns about information sharing
on OSNs (not shown in the paper).
Figure 2b shows the percentage of disclosure of informa-
tion based on the social ties with the requester. We can see
that, in accordance with previous UbiComp studies, there
are substantial differences7 between the close ties (“family”
and “friend”) and the more distant ones (“acquaintances” and
“colleagues”). For instance, the close ties are granted access
to any type of information (70%-80%) more than twice the
times compared to the more distant ones (30%). Moreover,
the level of detail of the shared information is much higher for
the close ties (up to 45% of “yes (high)”) compared to the dis-
tant ones (down to 8%). In fact, the proportion of “Yes (low)”
and “Yes (medium)” does not vary signiﬁcantly. Hence, the
results indicate that users tend to exhibit a more tailored shar-
ing behavior depending on the type of information, the social
ties and closeness with the requester [25]. As illustrated in
Figure 2c, the time at which the request is sent does not sub-
stantially inﬂuence the decision: users are slightly less will-
ing to share in the evening but exhibit the same behavior in the
morning as in the afternoon7. Our ﬁndings are aligned with
those obtained in [5], where the time of day and the location
do not appear to be inﬂuential factors when sharing personal
7With statistical signiﬁcance, based on global and pair-wise χ2 ho-
mogeneity tests with p < 0.01.
information such as location, as opposed to the type of social
ties with the requester.
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Figure 3. Histograms of the main reasons for (not) sharing.
We also looked at the reasons for (not) disclosing informa-
tion and at the users’ conﬁdence in their decisions. First we
observe that the social ties with the requester is by far the
most frequent reason for sharing (or not) information (45%-
67%), followed by the type of information (15%-28%) and
the current location (11%-21%). Second, we see again that
the higher the level of detail (Figure 3), the more important
the social ties with the requester (on average). Unsurpris-
ingly, the conﬁdence that the participants have in their deci-
sion (Figure 4) is lower for the intermediate level of detail:
It can be observed that the proportion of “Very conﬁdent” is
signiﬁcantly lower for “low” and “medium” levels of detail
than for “No” and “Yes (high)”. In addition, the proportion
of “Not so conﬁdent” is more than doubled for the most bor-
derline decision, i.e., “Yes (low)”. This could be explained
by the fact that users try to minimize the risk by limiting the
level of detail when their conﬁdence is low.
STATIC POLICIES
We compared the performance of our SPISM decision frame-
work with two other policy-based approaches. For the fol-
lowing comparisons, we used 10-fold cross validation and a
logistic regression binary classiﬁer. In order to be consis-
tent with the policy-based approaches, we only compare the
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Figure 4. Histograms of the users’ conﬁdence in their decisions.
binary (“Yes/No”) decisions here as the participants were in-
structed to only specify share/not share policies in the survey.
The ﬁrst policy-based approach, called AT studies, is inspired
from the ﬁndings presented in [2, 23], and is derived by the
following two rules:
1. Do not share any information while sleeping (12 AM - 6
AM) or eating (12 PM - 1 PM).
2. Do not share any information when you are around people
that are not your family members or friends, except when
you are at an event.
The second policy-based approach is derived from the indi-
vidual policies that each participant speciﬁed in free text in
the survey. We selected a random sample of 19 participants
and we manually transposed their free-text policies to a for-
mat suitable to be evaluated against their own decisions. The
participants speciﬁed between 1 and 15 policies (avg. 6.9).
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Figure 5. Histograms of the proportion of correct sharing decisions for
three different sharing policy approaches. The AT studies’ policies are
derived from [2, 23], the participants’ individual policies are derived
from their free text answer in the survey and the SPISM approach is
based on machine learning (without active learning).
The results of the three-way comparison are shown in Fig-
ure 5 where the results are sorted in descending order, based
on the performance of the participant’s individual policies.
First, we can observe that the SPISM machine-learning ap-
proach consistently outperforms the other two approaches
(this holds for all users when compared only to the AT poli-
cies deﬁned earlier). The SPISM performance rate is be-
tween 53% and 100%, with an average of 71%. Compared to
the participant’s policy (avg. 22%) and the AT studies (avg.
12%), SPISM is signiﬁcantly better at adapting itself to the
user’s sharing behavior. We also observe that usually where
the participants’ own policies correctly represent their actual
behavior, the AT policies exhibit the worst performance (left
side of Figure 5). The inverse appears to be true as well,
as the policies inspired by the AT studies perform better for
the participants whose own policies do not particularly match
their actual behavior. This points out an interesting question,
which is outside of the scope of this work: Are people who
are not able to articulate well their sharing policy better suited
to not trying to modify the default policies at all?
For the individual policies, we also observed the correctness
of the decisions as a function of the number of policies, and
found that a small number of policies (1-5) achieved up to
41% of correct decisions, followed by a slightly better per-
formance for the number of policies between 6 and 9 (up to
45%), and then a much worse performance (up to 28% of cor-
rect decisions) for the highest number of policies (10 - 15).
This suggests that there is an advantage in having a moderate
number of sharing policies (up to 9) but not higher; With a
larger number of policies, the risk of having overlapping but
contradicting policies is higher, which could result in a worse
overall performance.
MACHINE LEARNING
In order to assess the potential of (semi-)automatic
information-sharing decision making, which constitutes the
core of SPISM, we evaluate the performance of a logistic
classiﬁer in predicting the users’ sharing decisions. To do
so, we use the survey data comprised of 75 scenarios for each
of the 70 participants: Each scenario corresponds to a feature
vector and the decision made by the participant constitutes
the ground truth. We considered only the “Yes” and “No”
decisions. We evaluate the performance of the classiﬁer in
terms of the proportion of correct predictions (i.e., that match
the user’s decision), the proportion of cases where the infor-
mation is incorrectly shared (whereas the user would have
not shared it), thus compromising the user’s privacy, and the
proportion of cases where the information is incorrectly not
shared (whereas the user would have shared it), thus reducing
the utility of the system.
Firstly, we consider the case where the users ﬁrst manually
make n decisions to train the classiﬁer, and then the classi-
ﬁer makes the remaining decisions automatically. For several
values of n, and for each participant, we compute the aver-
age proportions of correct and incorrect decisions following
a 20-fold cross-validation approach. For each value of n, we
obtain one data point (i.e., a proportion of “correct”, “share
less”, and “share more” decisions) for each user and each
fold, that is 1,400 data points. We represent the results across
the different users and folds by showing the median, the ﬁrst
and third quartiles, and the 5 and 95-percentiles, as depicted
in Figure 6a. It can be observed that the median proportion of
correct decisions increases from 60% and reaches 70% for a
training set of only 30% of the data, which correspond to∼25
scenarios. The proportion of correct decisions then quickly
stabilizes around 74% after approximately 40 decisions (i.e.,
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Figure 6. Performance of the machine learning-based decision making algorithm.
∼50% of the data). The third quartile and the 95-percentile
show that for more than 25% of the users, the proportion of
correct decisions goes up to 80% and for some of them, it is
consistently higher than 96%. The proportion of incorrect de-
cisions is evenly distributed between sharing and not sharing
the information yet slightly biased towards incorrectly shar-
ing the information. Should a user favor her privacy over the
utility of the system, she could assign a higher error-penalty
to this type of errors in order to make decisions in a conserva-
tive way. Without penalties and active learning, over-sharing
happens in 10-20% of the cases, in line with the results re-
ported in [5] and obtained with different classiﬁers. Note that
the size of the training set (represented on the x-axis) repre-
sents the burden of the user as she has to manually make the
corresponding decisions.
Secondly, we consider the case of active learning in which
the user is asked to manually make the decision when the
conﬁdence of the classiﬁer is low. The classiﬁer outputs a
distribution over the possible decisions; we deﬁne the con-
ﬁdence as the normalized entropy of this distribution. The
classiﬁer is ﬁrst initialized with 10% of the data. For each
user, we run the active learning-based classiﬁer for several
values of the conﬁdence threshold (under which the user is
asked to make the decision). Each experiment gives one data
point comprised of (1) the proportion of decisions (includ-
ing the ﬁrst 10%) the user has to manually make and (2) the
proportions of correct and incorrect decisions (among the de-
cisions that are made automatically). In order to represent
the data in a form that is comparable to that of Figure 6a,
we group the data points in bins of size 5% (on the x-axis as
represented in the ﬁgure) based on the proportion of manual
decisions. Note that the number of data points varies across
the different bins. Within each bin, we compute the median
and the relevant percentiles. The result are depicted in Fig-
ure 6b. It can be observed that active learning outperforms
training-only learning in most cases (i.e., for a given number
of manual decisions, it provides a higher proportion of cor-
rect decisions). The proportion of manual decisions remains
lower than 50% which shows that the classiﬁer can make the
decision with very high-conﬁdence for at least half of the sce-
narios. For some users, the proportion of manual decisions
remains low (∼20%), regardless of the conﬁdence thresh-
old, and the proportion of correct decisions is high (∼80%).
This corresponds to the users whose decisions are highly pre-
dictable. With active learning, we observe a signiﬁcantly im-
proved performance in terms of over-sharing compared to the
absence of active learning. We posit that, coupled with cost-
sensitive classiﬁers, active learning can be used to improve
the correctness of the sharing decisions while maintaining a
signiﬁcantly lower over-sharing rate.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Mobile social networks allow users to share an increasing
number of contextual information, such as their location,
their activity and their co-presence with others. To simplify
the sharing process and improve usability, the research com-
munity has been studying sharing preferences and develop-
ing applications that, based on several contextual features,
can automate to some extent the sharing process. Machine-
learning approaches have been developed and evaluated for
speciﬁc instances of information (mostly location) or for on-
line social network (without the notion of context).
In this paper, we present and evaluate a novel privacy-
preserving information-sharing system (SPISM) that decides
in a (semi-)automated fashion whether or not to share differ-
ent types of contextual information and to what level of detail.
Using a personalized online user-study involving 70 partici-
pants, we show that SPISM signiﬁcantly outperforms both
individual and general user-deﬁned sharing policies, achiev-
ing up to 90% of correct sharing decisions, with only a lim-
ited cost for the user in terms of initial setup thanks to ac-
tive learning. We also show that the system has a slight bias
towards incorrectly sharing the information, which could be
mitigated by introducing a penalty for those kind of errors.
Furthermore, our results provide signiﬁcant insight into two
other crucial aspects of UbiComp studies: The reasons be-
hind a sharing decisions and the participants’ conﬁdence in
them. We show that the type of the requested information,
in addition to the social ties of the requester, is an inﬂuential
feature in the decision process.
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